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162 abstract
This paper presents an overview of theoretical and empirical research on the in-
teraction between political institutions and economic variables. Using the dyna-
mic panel model, the paper also investigates the indirect effects of electoral sy-
stems on the size of general government spending. The analysis is performed on a 
panel dataset of 26 countries (25 member states of the European Union and Cro-
atia) for the period between 1995 and 2010. The results show that government 
fragmentation and political stability affect the dynamics of budgetary expenditu-
res in line with theoretical assumptions. Regarding the implications of this rese-
arch for Croatia, it has been shown that a higher degree of government fragme-
ntation leads to an increase in government spending which is a significant result 
since Croatia has generally had some form of coalition government.
Keywords: political institutions, fiscal policy, electoral systems, government frag-
mentation, political competition, political stability
1 introduction
The correlation between political institutions and economic development is one of 
the most interesting research areas at the interface between economics and politi-
cal science (Persson and Tabellini, 2006). Specifically, modern politico-economic 
models view government as an endogenous factor in the political and economic 
system, which is in contrast with the conventional normative approach that sees 
the policy maker as a “benevolent social planner” whose only objective is to ma-
ximize social welfare (Snowdon and Vane, 2005:30). Within these models, econo-
mic policies are not designed independently of the influence of various aspects of 
political institutions. Government, responsible for the choice and implementation 
of economic policy, is at the centre of the interaction between political and econo-
mic factors. But the behaviour of government is shaped by the various institutio-
nal constraints that comprise the political system (Snowdon and Vane, 2005:521). 
Moreover, from the aspect of political economy, economic policy is fraught with 
conflicts of interest (Roberts Clark, Golder and Golder Nadenichek, 2009). These 
conflicts inevitably occur since societies are made of individuals and groups with 
specific values and interests as the result of their different occupations, sources of 
income, ideologies and so on (Persson and Tabellini, 2004b). In this context, Per-
sson and Tabellini (2000:207) identify three fundamental conflicts of interest. 
First, policymakers can exploit their political power and use public funds at the 
expense of voters. Second, voters come into conflict over the allocation of redistri-
butive transfers; and finally, the politicians come into conflict over the distribution 
of rents among themselves. Political institutions, which differ in many dimen-
sions, play the key role in the resolution of these conflicts. The aim of this paper 
is to determine the dimensions of political institutions that directly and/or indi-
rectly affect the size of government spending. Specifically, the paper empirically 
investigates whether a higher degree of government fragmentation, political com-
petition and political stability affect government spending dynamics.
v
a
l
e
n
t
in
a v
u
č
k
o
v
ić, m
a
r
t
in
a b
a
sa
r
a
c se
r
t
ić:
t
h
e e
ffe
c
t o
f po
l
it
ic
a
l in
st
it
u
t
io
n
s o
n t
h
e siz
e o
f g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t spe
n
d
in
g 
in e
u
r
o
pe
a
n u
n
io
n m
e
m
b
e
r sta
t
e
s a
n
d c
r
o
a
t
ia
f
in
a
n
c
ia
l  t
h
e
o
r
y a
n
d 
p
r
a
c
t
ic
e
37 (2) 161-179 (2013)
1632 the effect of electoral systems on fiscal policy 
outcomes: theoretical framework
The literature on the effects of political institutions on fiscal policy recorded signi-
ficant growth in the last twenty years (for example, Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and 
Rostagno, 2002; Persson and Tabellini, 2000, 2003, 2004; Persson, 2002; Persson, 
Roland and Tabellini, 2003; Voigt, 2009; Gregorini and Longoni, 2010; Acemo-
glu, 2005; Blume et al., 2007; Hallerberg and von Hagen, 1997), which has signi-
ficantly improved the understanding of politico-economic relations in society. In 
most of these studies, there are two categories of political institutions under re-
view: electoral systems and forms of government. Although there is no universal 
consensus regarding their effects on fiscal policy, it is generally considered in the 
literature that the parliamentary form of government and proportional electoral 
system are characterized by higher government spending and taxes, higher wel-
fare states, higher budget deficits and public debt. On the other hand, the presiden-
tial form of government and a majoritarian (plurality) electoral system are cha-
racterized by lower government spending and taxes, lower welfare states and 
more balanced budget. Thus, there are good reasons to restrict the research to fi-
scal policy outcomes. Moreover, numerous authors in their analyses use the size 
and structure of government spending, tax revenues, budget balance and public 
debt as relevant variables.
The objective of this paper is to investigate electoral rules for the election of poli-
tical candidates and their potential effects on fiscal policy outcomes. These rules 
differ from the aspect of three main characteristics: district magnitude, electoral 
formula and ballot structure (Persson and Tabellini, 2004b). First, district magni-
tude determines the number of seats (legislators) in the district, distinguishing 
between single- and multi-member districts. This dimension of electoral rules af-
fects both the degree of proportionality and representation (of relevant social 
groups by politicians) of elections1 and is considered the most effective and highly 
manipulated political dimension of the electoral system (Kasapović, 2003:152). 
Generally, larger districts increase electoral competition encouraging politicians 
to seek support from broader coalitions of voters, which generates larger and bro-
ader fiscal programs. Smaller districts, on the other side, foster attention to pivotal 
geographical constituencies inducing a larger number of specific programs and 
benefits (Klašnja, 2008). Next, the electoral formula is considered to be the most 
important dimension of electoral rules. It encompasses rules and methods for tran-
slating votes into seats2, distinguishing between plurality and proportional electo-
ral rule (Persson and Tabellini, 2004b). Politicians do not need to take into account 
1 Larger districts are more proportional and representative; with a larger district the number of candidates in 
the political process increases (who can produce lower equilibrium rents) but also voters can punish corrupt 
parties with lower ideological costs (Persson, 2002).
2 An electoral formula determines the minimum number of votes needed to win the elections. The majoritarian 
electoral system is based on plurality rule (the electoral winner is determined by relative or absolute majority 
of the votes) while the proportional electoral system is based on the principle of proportional representation 
(PR) of the electorate (distribution of seats proportional to the number of obtained votes) (Kasapović, 2003).
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164 the preferences and interests of all voters, but primarily need to please those that 
will help them to win the elections (Klašnja, 2008). Since under plurality rule the 
share of total votes needed is smaller than under proportional rule, government 
spending will be directed towards smaller and geographically more targeted seg-
ments of voters3 which generates preferences for instruments such as local public 
goods, pork-barrel spending, etc. (Persson and Tabellini, 2003; Milesi-Feretti, Pe-
rotti and Rostagno, 2002). On the other hand, under proportional rule, politicians 
try to internalize benefits for larger segments of the population which results in 
higher government spending based on universal transfers and programs that bene-
fit larger groups of population (Persson and Tabellini, 2003). The third dimension 
of electoral rules, ballot structure, determines how voters vote and cast their pre-
ferences among individual political candidates and party lists. This dimension has 
an effect on fiscal policy through attribution to and sensitivity of votes to incum-
bents’ performance (Klašnja, 2008). In general, plurality (proportional) electoral 
system is based on individual candidates (party lists) (Voigt, 2009). Specifically, 
under the proportional system based on party lists, due to the lower political ac-
countability, one can expect problems of free riders, rent-seeking and increased 
corruption (Persson and Tabellini, 2000; 2003). All of this can then result in exces-
sive spending of policy-makers and the consequent pressure on tax increases. Al-
though the described dimensions of political institutions are theoretically distinct, 
they are usually correlated across countries which led to a classification into two 
main electoral systems: majoritarian (plurality) and proportional (Persson and Ta-
bellini, 2004b). Generally, countries using plurality rule have a minimum district 
magnitude (single-member districts) and allow voting for individual candidates, 
while countries using proportional rule have larger districts and rely on voting for 
party lists (Voigt, 2009). Hence, there is a trade-off between two electoral systems, 
neither of which delivers superior outcomes. Proportional systems are more repre-
sentative but induce more spending, rent-seeking activities and redistribution in 
favour of the majority. On the other side, majoritarian systems are characterized 
with redistribution in favour of minorities, lower spending and higher political 
accountability (Klašnja, 2008). 
Electoral systems can also have an indirect impact on fiscal policy through their 
effects on the structure of political parties, type of government, political competi-
tion as well as political stability (see Besley, Persson and Sturm, 2010; Persson 
and Tabellini, 2006; Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 2003; Gregorini and Longoni, 
2010; Padovano and Venturi, 2001). For example, the proportional electoral sy-
stem is associated with a more fragmented party system with frequent coalition 
governments while majoritarian electoral systems often result in single-party go-
vernment. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect that these effects are also 
reflected in the economic policies implemented under different types of party sy-
stems and governments. In general, with increasing government fragmentation, 
one can expect higher spending targeted towards more heterogeneous population 
3 In other words, politicians will be more focused on swing voters. 
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165groups (Gregorini and Longoni, 2010). A more detailed description of the correla-
tion between these dimensions of political institutions and government spending 
is given in the section dealing with the econometric analysis (section 4) since 
these categories of political institutions are included in the model.
3 empirical literature review and methodological issues 
Although from the empirical point of view there still remain many challenges, 
existing studies have generally confirmed the significance of political institutions 
for economic policy making. Persson and Tabellini (2003) conducted a study on a 
sample of 85 countries for the 1990s and showed that the total spending of the 
central government is on average 4-5% of GDP higher in a proportional than in a 
majoritarian electoral system. Their results also showed that the reform from pro-
portional to majoritarian electoral system leads to a decrease in social security 
expenditures by an average of 2-3% of GDP as well as to a decrease in the budget 
deficit by 1-2% of GDP. Moreover, Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2002) 
investigated the impact of electoral systems on the size and composition of go-
vernment spending on a sample of 20 countries of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and 20 countries of Latin America. Their 
results also imply that proportional electoral systems (in comparison to majorita-
rian systems) are characterized by higher total government spending and higher 
transfer payments (opposed to the local public goods). Blume et al. (2007), based 
on the analysis of Persson and Tabellini (2003) and by increasing the number of 
countries in the sample to 116, show that central government spending is on ave-
rage 7% lower in a majoritarian than in a proportional electoral system. However, 
the authors point out that the district size and the proportion of individually elected 
candidates are more important factors than electoral system per se. Persson and 
Tabellini (2006:729), discussing both the direct and indirect effects, point out that 
electoral systems affect government spending only indirectly through the stru-
cture and type of government. In this line of research, Gregorini and Longoni 
(2010) performed an analysis controlling for the effects of government fragme-
ntation (i.e. distribution of seats within a particular government) on spending. As 
pointed out by the authors, there are countries with proportional electoral systems 
and low fragmentation (and vice versa), which makes it interesting to analyse the 
differences between the degree of government fragmentation (even within the two 
categories of electoral systems) and their impact on policy makers’ preferences for 
public spending. They argue that with a higher degree of fragmentation, go-
vernment spending increases and focuses on more heterogeneous groups. Roubini 
and Sachs (1989) also showed that more fragmented governments are characteri-
zed by higher deficit and public debt (in OECD countries), primarily due to their 
tendency to excessive spending because of different interests and constituencies, 
veto powers over budget or weak enforcement mechanisms for binding commit-
ments among coalition partners.
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166 On a sample of 50 U.S. state governments, Poterba (1994) confirms that fiscal 
institutions and political factors affect deficit dynamics (in the short run). States in 
which one party controls both the governorship and the state house are more likely 
to react quickly to unexpected deficits compared to those in which control is divi-
ded between parties. Hallerberg and von Hagen (1997) analysed the impact of the 
electoral systems and the number of parties on fiscal policy outcomes and conclu-
ded that the process of delegation of authority to the finance minister or the com-
mitment to negotiated fiscal contracts may have a significant impact on the budget 
deficit growth, arguing that such institutions can be particularly effective in kee-
ping deficits low in countries with some form of political instability. Moreover, 
Hallerberg and von Hagen (1997) suggest that countries that want to reduce their 
deficits should choose one of these budgetary institutions based on a form of go-
vernment, either a single-party majority government or a multi-party coalition 
government (whereby single-party governments are more suitable for delegation, 
while multi-party governments rely more on fiscal contracts). In addition, the au-
thors point out that the comparison of the various systems and solutions applied 
indicates that (under certain conditions) the role of a strong finance minister can 
be extended to multi-party governments. Alesina et al. (1999) also emphasize the 
significance of cross-country variation in fiscal performance, explaining these dif-
ferences by focusing upon the procedures which lead to the formulation, approval 
and implementation of the budget. Analysing the impact of budgetary procedures 
on a sample of 20 Latin American and Caribbean countries (between 1980 and 
1992), the authors conclude that more transparent and hierarchical procedures4 
lead to lower deficit levels. 
While some results are consistent with theoretical predictions, others require more 
detailed analysis. Moreover, there is a specific degree of criticism of applied eco-
nometric tools, which are highly sensitive to sample size, time period used as well 
as to the selection of variables. From the aspect of countries included in the 
analysis, criticisms usually refer to the government ideology. It is generally assu-
med that proportional electoral systems lead to more redistribution by facilitating 
the election of left-wing parties which represent the interests of low-income vo-
ters, while right-wing governments representing the interests of high-income vo-
ters are associated with plurality electoral system (for details see Roberts Clark, 
Golder and Golder Nadenichek, 2009:713-715). Therefore, according to the au-
thors, this argument could illustrate why the expenditures are higher under the 
proportional system. In a situation in which the electoral system is determined on 
the basis of policies implemented by policymakers, this could account for the 
correlation with ideology: under the domination of left-wing voters one would 
choose a proportional electoral system, while the plurality system would be cho-
sen under the domination of right-wing ideology (Persson and Tabellini, 2004b). 
However, the authors also argue that empirical results cast doubt on this criticism 
4 Alesina and Perotti (1999) stressed that hierarchical budgetary procedures are analogous to majoritarian 
electoral systems. 
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167since even if electoral systems affect policy through the ideology of the go-
vernment (and not e.g. through the number of parties in the government) then the 
electoral rule itself would not be a valid instrument for the incidence of coalition 
governments in a regression on government expenditure which is in contrast with 
obtained research results. Acemoglu (2005) presents a comprehensive critique of 
various estimation methods and variable selection, especially from the aspect of 
the application of the ordinary least squares method (OLS) which relies on the 
exogeneity of political institutions. The author points out that although the OLS 
results uncover interesting patterns, they do not completely identify causal effects 
since political institutions are determined by various social factors that are not 
fully controlled for in the models. Therefore, he suggests an alternative approach 
within which political institutions should be endogenous, i.e. determined by the 
same factors that have a direct effect on economic policy outcomes5. 
Furthermore, while various studies include in their samples a large number of 
countries that differ in numerous aspects, it is also interesting to focus research on 
more homogeneous group of countries. Finally, since many findings are still pre-
liminary and the subject of continuous debates, the research area on the impact of 
political institutions has much potential for further analysis. Because existing stra-
tegies for comparative research tend to ignore the relationship among electoral 
systems, party structures, the government formation and fiscal policy making, re-
search needs to focus more on better understanding of the detailed mechanisms 
regarding the influence of political institutions on economic policy (as suggested 
by Persson and Tabellini, 2003). 
The literature review revealed a process of decision making that differs from the 
ideal normative model. The government does not necessarily operate in the public 
interest but serves the interests of various agents (i.e. state capture) and leads to 
different effects on various social groups (Acocella, 2005; Hellman and Schanke-
rman, 2000). Therefore, discussions regarding electoral system reforms have been 
present since the 1990s in both countries characterized as “new democracies” and 
in developed democracies such as the United Kingdom. In addition, some reforms 
have been implemented e.g. in New Zealand, Japan and Italy (Persson and Tabe-
llini, 2004b). However, it still remains an open question which combination of 
different dimensions of political institutions is superior. In this context, the contri-
bution of economists to the discussion on the future of the political institutions at 
the EU level is relatively slight (Voigt, 2009).
4 empirical analysis
Analysis of the effects of fiscal and hence political institutions was stimulated by 
the need to control excessive spending and deficits in OECD and developing 
countries; as well as by the European Union’s desire to design a set of rules to 
5 Rational agents should understand and have preferences over both implications of economic policies and 
various political institutions (Acemoglu, 2005). 
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168 govern national fiscal policies in its member states (von Hagen, 2006). The signi-
ficance of political institutions for economic policy making is reflected through 
their governing of decisions regarding public finances, which can result in mitiga-
tion of adverse effects of the principal-agent and common-pool problem (for de-
tails see von Hagen, 2006). Furthermore, Lohman (2006:523) highlights two im-
portant issues. First, that economic policy deviates from the normative aspects of 
economic theory and second, that economic performance changes over time and 
differs across countries to a degree that economic factors cannot explain. The au-
thor also raises the question whether political factors – collective action and poli-
tical institutions – can explain these issues. 
Therefore, the goal of this section is to analyse empirically theoretical predictions 
about the impact of political institutions on fiscal policy outcomes in the EU and 
Croatia. The research encompasses the analysis of the indirect impact of electoral 
systems on government spending. Special weight in this paper is given to a panel 
data analysis for the period between 1995 and 2010 on a sample of 25 EU member 
states6 and Croatia. Figure 1 shows the average size of government spending in the 
EU–27 (measured by the share of total general government spending in GDP). We 
can see that there was not much variation until 2008 when a significant increase 
was recorded. On the other side, figure 2 shows that cross-country expenditure 
(average values for the period between 1995 and 2010) ranges from 35% to 55% 
of GDP. Based on these trends, it appears that the size of the state varies among 
countries, and slightly less over time. 
figure 1 
The share of total general government spending in GDP (EU-27 average), 
1995-2010 
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Source: Eurostat.
6 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Finland, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Netherlands, Germany, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Spain, Sweden, UK.
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169figure 2 
The share of total general government spending in GDP (cross-country average 
for 1995-2010 period) 
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Source: Eurostat.
Since with the process of EU integration member states commit themselves to 
follow certain rules on their policies, which results in the implementation of simi-
lar economic policies at national levels, the main question then is what caused the 
observed variation. One of the potential answers is that political institutions have 
a significant impact on economic policy making. This is supported by the research 
of Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen (2007) who argue that although all EU 
member states are faced with the same fiscal framework, there are significant va-
riations in their budgetary institutions at national levels, stemming from the speci-
fic characteristics of their political institutions. In Croatia, the issues of political 
institutions were partially the research subject of Rubil and Švaljek (2010) who, 
based on an analysis of the Croatian political system, argue for the use of fiscal 
rules. However, according to the present writers’ knowledge, there are few detai-
led papers on the correlation between political institutions and fiscal policy outco-
mes. 
From the aspect of political institutions that are usually analysed in the literature, 
all EU countries except France and UK have a proportional electoral system7. 
Therefore, we analyse the source of variation in government expenditure from the 
aspect of specific dimensions within the electoral system. Thus, the contribution 
of this paper to the literature is reflected in analysis of detailed mechanisms, i.e. 
indirect effects of electoral systems (through selected dimensions of government 
fragmentation, political competition and political stability) on the size of go-
vernment. Based on the recommendations of Aidt and Eterovic (2011), analysis is 
performed on a more homogenous group of countries (so far, most research has 
conducted analysis of a sample of a large number of developed and developing 
7 From the aspect of the form of government, all of the member states except Cyprus, Poland and Lithuania 
have a parliamentary system.
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170 countries that differ in their economic, geographic, cultural and social characteri-
stics). 
4.1 description of the model and variables
Econometric analysis is performed using the dynamic panel model8 based on the 
Arellano-Bond (1991) generalised method of moments (GMM). Compared to sta-
tic models, dynamic panel models are often used in economics since even though 
the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is not of direct interest, allowing 
for the dynamics may be crucial for recovering consistent estimates of other para-
meters (Bond, 2002). Since the dataset used in this paper is characterized by a 
smaller number of periods and large number of observation units, the Arellano-
Bond estimator is used. This estimator is widely used for the analysis of linear 
relationship with the dynamic dependent variable (i.e. variable dependent on its 
own past values) and in a situation in which the independent variables are not 
strictly exogenous. In addition, the estimator takes into account the specificity of 
each observed unit and allows for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within 
the unit of observation, but not across them (Roodman, 2006). The Arellano-Bond 
estimation begins by transforming all regressors, usually by differencing, and uses 
the generalised method of moments (Hansen, 1982). Furthermore, since data for 
all countries and periods of interest are not available, an unbalanced9 panel model 
is used. The model is described by the following equation:
, and = 1,…, N, t = 1,…, T, (1)
where N is the number of units of observation, T is the number of periods, y
it
 
stands for the value of the dependent variable (total general government expendi-
tures for 25 EU member states and Croatia, expressed as a share in GDP – exp) i 
in the period t, the parameter is the constant,  is the scalar,  is the one-
period-lagged (one year) dependent variable (for the same country),  
are the K of independent variables (herfgov, polityIV, gdp_gr, pop and stabs) for 
the member state i during the period t (i.e. ),  is the 
fixed element or random error for the unit of observation, and  the error term. It 
is assumed that all variables  are strictly exogenous and uncorrelated with any
10. 
8 In general, given the characteristics of the panel data, we can distinguish between static (combined or poo-
led models, fixed effect models and random effect models) and dynamic models. The static panel models are 
robust in terms of the correlation within the unit of observation, but the choice of the panel model is not sim-
ple since the correlation between observations within a single unit of observation must be constant regardless 
of time period across these observations (Škrabić, 2009). This may impose some limitations since economic 
variables usually feature a correlation between the current value of the variable and its value from the pre-
vious period, and if this correlation is ignored, the estimated parameters of the model will be consistent but 
inefficient with biased standard errors (Škrabić, 2009).
9 In balanced panel data models all units have values in all periods.
10 However, the assumption of strict exogeneity is often replaced by the assumption of predetermination, which 
means that the current and lagged values of each independent variable are uncorrelated with the current va lues 
of error terms (Škrabić, 2009).
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171Following the research of Gregorini and Longoni (2010), government fragmenta-
tion is proxied by the Herfindahl index11 (herfgov) which represents a measure of 
concentration of ruling coalition. In the case of single-party government, the index 
equals 1 while in the case of a coalition government, it takes a value between 0 
and 1. Thus, the higher the number of parties in coalition government the lower is 
the value of the Herfindahl index. On the other hand, the index will be higher with 
the dominant party in the coalition government. From the aspect of the effect on 
government expenditures, a higher fragmentation (lower index value) leads to an 
increase in the expenditures. The higher the number of parties in the coalition 
government, the higher the probability of a common-pool problem since each 
political party will try to target the interests of their constituency (Persson and 
Tabellini, 2003). That is, an increase in the value of Herfindahl index (i.e. the de-
crease of the number of parties in the coalition government) results in the decrease 
of government spending. Therefore, we expect a negative sign of the coefficient 
with this variable. Furthermore, although polityIV is generally interpreted as a 
measure of democracy, according to some authors this variable can also be inter-
preted as a measure of the degree of political competition among political parties, 
interest groups and other organized factions who compete in order to gain political 
power within a defined political structure (for more details see Aidt and Eterovic, 
2011). From this aspect, a higher degree of political competition can be associated 
with more efficient government (ruling party has incentives for better perfo rmance 
in order to be re-elected) so in this case a negative sign of the coefficient is expe-
cted (Aidt and Eterovic, 2011; Besley, Persson and Sturm, 2010)12. However, in a 
case in which the probability of a re-election is low, politicians can behave oppo-
rtunistically and one can expect an increase in government expenditure in order to 
“buy” the votes needed to win the elections. Finally, the variable stabs is used as 
a variable for political stability and it is defined as the share of veto players that 
drop out of the government in any given year (Beck et al., 2001). The sign of the 
coefficient on the variable stabs can be both positive and negative: while higher 
stability is in general characterised by lower government expenditure (Devereux 
and Wen, 1998), it could also lead to excessive spending and higher debt since it 
could make it easier for government to use public finances strategically in order to 
keep the parliamentary majority (Tabellini and Alesina, 1990; Padovano and 
 Venturi, 2001). We also use the following control variables: gdp_gr and pop. Vari-
able gdp_gr represents the value of the real GDP growth rate and it is used as a 
proxy for general economic development and the impact of business cycles on 
expenditures. The expected sign of this variable can be positive or negative, de-
pending on the discretionary fiscal policy. Furthermore, the variable pop indicates 
the proportion of the population aged 60 years and over, and as the aging popula-
tion puts additional pressure on the increase in total expenditures (primarily 
through spending on pensions and health care) we expect a positive sign of the 
11 Generally, the measure is calculated as the sum of the squared seat shares of all parties in the government 
and shows how the seats are distributed within the government coalition.
12 Additional reasons for expected negative coefficient with the variable polityIV are listed in Aidt and Ete-
rovic (2011).
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172 coefficient with this variable. The lagged value of a dependent variable (one-pe-
riod lag) will be used as an instrumental variable. Furthermore, the validity of the 
instruments selected for the evaluation of the model is tested using the Sargan 
test13. Besides the Sargan test, testing the autocorrelation in residuals is also per-
formed using the  tests
 14. Table 1 lists the variables used in the analysis 
as well as data sources. 
table 1 
Variables and data sources 
Variable Description source
exp
Total general government 
expenditure (in % of GDP)
Eurostat, Croatian National Bank
herfgov Herfindahl index
Database of Political Institutions 
(DPI)
polityIV Political competition Polity IV Project
bdp_gr Real GDP growth rate Eurostat
pop
Share of population aged 60  
years and over
Eurostat
stabs Political stability Database of Political Institutions
Source: Authors’ compilation.
4.2 results and implications for croatia
Table 2 shows the results of the estimated impact of the selected variables on bud-
getary expenditures in the EU member states and Croatia as well as the diagnostic 
tests of dynamic panel data analysis. The tests for first- and second-order autocor-
relation yield the expected results, i.e. the tests do not reject the absence of sec-
ond-order autocorrelation15 among differenced residuals. Moreover, the Sargan 
test for over-identification restrictions does not reject the null hypothesis of the 
absence of correlation between the residuals and the instrumental variables. The 
lagged dependent variable is statistically significant and has a positive sign. Fur-
thermore, the results show that the variables herfgov, bdp_gr, pop and stabs are 
statistically significant, with the expected signs of estimated coefficients. There-
fore, general government spending in EU member states and Croatia is influenced 
by government fragmentation and political stability; higher government fragmen-
tation (a lower Herfindahl index) leads to an increase in government expenditures. 
13 The Sargan test for over-identification of the restrictions in the statistical model (i.e. the validity of instru-
mental variables) is based on the assumption that the residuals should be uncorrelated with a set of exoge-
nous variables if the instruments are exogenous. This test has the null hypothesis that the instrumental varia-
bles are uncorrelated with the set of residuals. 
14 The null hypothesis of the  test assumes the absence of a first-order autocorrelation between differe nced 
residuals, and the null hypothesis of the  test assumes the absence of a second-order autocorrelation betwe-
en differenced residuals. 
15 Considering that the first order autocorrelation is usually expected among the residuals its presence is often 
neglected. On the other side, the absence of second-order autocorrelation does not refer to problems of model 
specification, i.e. does not imply that some of the moment conditions are invalid (Huang, 2006; Škrabić, 2009). 
Furthermore, despite the existence of the first order autocorrelation but with no second-order autocorrelation, 
GMM estimates are consistent (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
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173Furthermore, political stability (decrease in the variable stabs) is positively asso-
ciated with government spending. Control variables – GDP growth rate and aging 
population – are also significant in the model. Finally, the degree of political com-
petition (polityIV) and the constant term are not statistically significant.
table 2 
Results of the dynamic panel model
Variable Results
C -0.093 (0.283)
  0.678 (0.000*)
herfgov -2.784 (0.010*)
polityIV -0.051 (0.886)
gdp_gr -0.329 (0.000*)
pop 0.658 (0.085***)
stabs -1.073 (0.007*)
Number of observations 355
Number of countries 26
Sargan test (p-value) 0.5241
Autocorrelation of first order (p-value) 0.0000
Autocorrelation of second order (p-value) 0.8278
Note: *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at levels of 1%, 5% and 10%; p-values are in 
brackets.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Results are consistent with previously described theoretical and empirical studies 
(e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 2006; Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 2003; Gregorini 
and Longoni, 2010; Hallerberg and von Hagen, 1997, etc.). However, the key is-
sue is the normative implications of the research. Electoral systems (through defi-
ning the “rules of the game”) are supposed to establish a balance between the re-
presentation and accountability regarded as two measures of the performance of 
democratic institutions (Persson and Tabellini, 2006). The dimension of electoral 
systems that attracts the most attention is proportionality – proportional systems 
lead to an increase in political representation in combination with adverse fiscal 
policy outcomes so the main question is whether (and how) this trade-off can be 
mitigated (Fabrizio and Mody, 2007). Since electoral systems are operating in the 
complex framework of historical, social, cultural, institutional and political fac-
tors, a historical and empirical approach is essential to normative issues (Nohlen, 
1992). Finally, the design of any potential electoral reform includes two key steps. 
The first step is based on the scientific and political evaluation of the functionality 
of the existing electoral system, while the second step encompasses defining the 
objectives of electoral politics (Kasapović, 2003).
Therefore, the results obtained in this study can serve as a basis for the analysis of 
the practical role of political institutions in economic policy making and can have 
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174 significant implications for Croatia due to the continuing debates of whether Cro-
atia needs yet another reform of the electoral system. In 1990s Croatia changed all 
of the main models of the electoral system: absolute majoritarian system (1990), 
mixed system with an equal weight of majority and party list seats (1992), mixed 
system with the prevailing share of list seats (1995) and proportional electoral 
system with multi-member districts and closed (blocked) lists (2000) (Kasapović, 
2001). In addition, in 2000 the semi-parliamentary form of government was repla-
ced with the parliamentary one which consequently limited the powers of the 
President and strengthened the role of the Government16. Considering that Croatia 
has implemented a number of reforms in a relatively short period of time, it would 
be advisable in future research to analyse whether these reforms are reflected in 
the size and composition of government spending, budget balance and public 
debt. Although so far there has been no detailed research on this issue, it can be 
concluded that the reform introducing a proportional electoral system increased 
the frequency of coalition governments. Since 2000 Croatia has had some form of 
coalition government, and this, according to theoretical assumptions and the re-
sults of empirical analysis, leads to an increase in government spending. This 
finding is important since with more frequent coalition governments, there is a 
higher probability of common-pool problem between ruling parties where each of 
them will try to benefit their own constituencies thus increasing the total go-
vernment expenditure (Voigt, 2009). All of this could also have had an impact, 
primarily through the decrease of accountability, on voters in Croatia – both on 
their decisions regarding which party to punish (reward) in the case of adverse 
(favourable) economic performance as well as on decrease diminution in voter 
confidence in the government. Therefore, the findings obtained in this paper could 
contribute further to discussions on potential reforms of electoral system (or some 
of its dimensions) in Croatia. 
5 concluding remarks
A review of theoretical predictions and previous empirical research has shown 
that political institutions affect the outcomes of economic policy. However, the 
detailed mechanisms through which specific institutions affect different outcomes 
are ambiguous and the empirical literature in this area is still faced with numerous 
challenges. Results of the empirical analysis performed in this paper show that 
statistically the most significant effect on government spending comes from go-
vernment fragmentation and political (in)stability, which is in line with previous 
studies suggesting that the electoral system has an indirect impact on policy out-
comes. It has been shown that higher government fragmentation leads to an incre-
ase in government spending. This result is important for Croatia, which during the 
analysed period had some form of coalition government, an institution that is 
usually characterized with common-pool and the collective decision-making pro-
16 The main characteristics of the presidential form of government were high concentration of power in the 
institution of the President who was the main actor in the political system as well as the high personifica-
tion of politics.
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175blems. However, given that there are still some dimensions of electoral systems 
that are not considered in this paper, which also can have an impact on the design 
of fiscal policy, one should be careful with interpretation of results regarding the 
superiority of one electoral system over another.
Taking into account all of the limitations of the research (endogeneity of political 
institutions, the sample size and time period), the findings in this paper are preli-
minary. The main objective is to encourage further discussion in this research 
area, which has not previously been analysed in this way in Croatia. Moreover, 
with the negative effects of the global economic crisis one can expect that more 
attention will be directed towards the positive and normative aspects of constitu-
tional political economy.
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